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 Abstract: Taking a point of departure in theories which explain the relation between victimization 
and sacred groundings of community, the article relates to the recent and evolving literature on 
memory, forgiveness and reconciliation, reflecting on the need for a restoration of the potential 
which lies in memory and forgiveness. Of special importance are the theories of Habermas, 
Derrida and Ricoeur, which assert the necessity of memorizing the traumas of founding violence 
and creating a more conciliate climate. A common trait is a fuller affirmation of a post-secular 
agenda in humanities. While Habermas defends a communicative approach, Derrida will defend 
a deconstructive messianicity affirmative of religious hospitality. Ricoeur will defend a caritative 
approach: Confronting violence makes necessary an ethics of memory and forgetting where 
forgiveness sustained by love form a therapy for the post-secular epoch. Towards the end of the 
article we discuss this disagreement. Ricoeur’s approach suggests a middle way between 
Habermas and Derrida. Giving significance to Ricoeur’s theory of linguistification of the sacred 
through metaphor and speech-act, we learn that Christianity`s emphasis on gifted and incarnate 
mutuality, communicate a performative gesture indispensable for dialogue.  
PAUL RICOEUR’ S SUGGESTION OF FORGIVENESS AS  
THERAPY FOR THE POST-SECULAR CONDITION 
By Dag Helge Moldenhagen 
 
    1.0. Some theoretical presuppositions for the necessity of forgiveness on the ethico-political level. 
A trait in contemporary ethics is that no one wants a retreat back to the devastating manifestations 
of state terrorism and the romanticism around community identity that evolved in the midst of the 
twentieth century. Through deeper reflexivity, an appreciation of peace, commitment, and human 
rights, ethics tries to establish a more just and open democracy. Yet, our sorrow is that these 
hopes of democracies have not been fulfilled. Risk of terror and deep oppression was still 
haunting Europe until the turn of the millennium, showing that violence against the other is part 
of a larger problem of identity and otherness, as in Croatia in 1992 (Volf 1996). Some of the 
reactions after the event of  9/11 have also been diagnosed as a new romanticism around state 
identity (Butler 2004). This suggests that victimization with its reduction of citizenship lay at a 
very deep level in Western morality, and is not a surface phenomenon, but part of our social 
traditions. Variables of pathological emotions, anxiety, shame, desire, stigma, moral panic 
(Goffman 1963;Nussbaum 2004), or efforts to clean society from contagious elements (filth), 
together with social misunderstandings, the collective traumatic, the prohibition of mourning, 
upheld and regenerated by symbol making, form a “system” of victimage society (Douglas 
1966;Goffman 1963;Hughes 2002;Nussbaum 2004).There is a deep inability to communicate 
trauma (Caruth 1996;Gillis 1994;Natzmer 2002).Theories will even suggest that religion and 
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societies are structured from  foundational violent events: In the beginning of culture is the sacred 
victim. Religion may reconcile people, but does so by way of a legitimizing founding murder 
(Girard 1977;Taylor 2006). Sacrificial processes require a certain degree of social 
misunderstanding and forgetting. 
 New theory seems to make a difference to how this forgetting is treated in post-secular 
societies. For Agamben the difference between the post-secular society, an archaic situation 
where the murder is hidden in ritual practice, and a fully secular order where religion’s way of 
hiding the reconciling murder is manifested, is that the victimage constraint now seems to be 
partly hidden, partly manifest. As Agamben implies, victims must now be held captive without 
ritual and without murder. The idea of the sacred victim is indissociable from the idea of state 
sovereignty. The sovereign sphere is the sphere in which it is permitted to kill without committing 
homicide and without celebrating a sacrifice. The state of exception is a situation where sacred 
life is laid out as bare life, placed in a suspended zone, a zone of anomie (Agamben 
1998;Agamben 2005). According to Butler, this relates to a hierarchy of grief, a prohibition of 
certain forms of public grieving, performed by post-secular governmentality (Butler 2004). 
 What Agamben and Butler point to, is a possibility which makes necessary efforts of 
reconciliation. Their theory is related to the critical theory of Benjamin, Adorno and Horkheimer 
which suggests anamnestic (recollective) solidarity as a pragmatics of reconciliation. Earlier, 
Adorno’s theory was extended by Habermas’ appeal for a therapeutic, reparatory agenda in ethics 
and an imperative of reconciliation through the public use of reason (Habermas 1992,55-57; 
1995b). Societies must be grounded on memorative, open constructions of identity; a memory 
that reconciles with victims and makes democracy into a project of humanization. Other 
discourses reflect on establishing a conciliatory climate out of memory and mourning strategies 
(Bloom 1997), a caritative approach of healing of memory through public forgiveness (Ricoeur), 
societal hospitality (Derrida 1994;Derrida 2002;Derrida & Vattimo 1998), political forgiveness 
(Amstutz 2005), Ubuntu spirituality (Battle 2002), or the traditions of religions (Heft, J eds 
2004).   
   A repeated problem in these discourses, is the status of the claims of religions seen in 
relation to violence towards the victim, the persistence of trauma and false memory, and the 
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thesis of a possibly human capacity to forgive and release the offender from the act. We may also 
ask what paradigm of forgiveness is congruent to an understanding of how forgiveness can be 
operative in institutions? Is the practice of forgiveness a question of religious spirituality or 
secular reason? How will arguments relate to what the philosophy of language tells us of the use 
of language? 
   In this article I show how Ricoeur defends a theory of reconciliation 1) inclusive to 
christian thought, 2) a view on how the linguistification of the sacred (gifts) both limits and 
enable practice, and 3) a pragmatics of how institutional and pragmatic constraints must be taken 
into account. Giving significance to his theory of forgiveness as universalized speech-act, we 
learn that emphasis on gifted mutuality, communicates a performative gesture which is 
indispensable for dialogue, but not exclusive to the arguments of Habermas and Derrida. Situated 
between Habermas and Derrida, Ricoeur, is also compatible with Agamben and Butler’s 
understanding of post-secular society as a blurring of the borders between sacred and 
governmental regime. 
2.0 Paul Ricoeur’s therapy for the post-secular condition 
                 Ricoeur’s alternative route must be understood in combination with his understanding of 
language, a dialectic between a hermeneutic of suspicion and a recollective technique giving 
tribute to a restorative move from “naïve faith” to a “second faith” that is attained by 
phenomenology, tribute to spiritual convictions and traditions, analogy and kinship (Gadamer), 
observance of fault, solitude, death, liminality (Jaspers), a hermeneutic of the significance of 
action, combined with a plea for difference, societal citizenship (Arendt), and the need for just 
democracy (Ricoeur 1996). Evil and frailty are contingent structures and can only be explored 
through symbols and metaphor in how the symbol sets us thinking. Ricoeur criticizes an approach 
where symbol is reduced to a system of signs without any anchor in a subject or extralinguistic 
factors (Ricoeur 1996 ,22,29). In accordance with results in analytical philosophy, Ricoeur finds 
the speech-act theory of Austin and Searle to give reliable support to his own theory: To Ricoeur, 
speech-act theory facilitates the integration of action, hermeneutics and ideas of speech as an 
event (Ricoeur 1996,32-33,40;Wallace 2000). This makes it possible to see speech-events in 
relation to “the sense of history in general, the place of violence and nonviolence in history, the 
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sense of history and Christian eschatology, progress, ambiguity, hope,…”(Ricoeur 1996,cit. 39). 
Ricoeur`s hermeneutical phenomenology is enriched by a theory of narrative configuration 
(Ricoeur 1994,113-115).   
  In his ethics written in the nineties Ricoeur asserts that there always will be a tension 
between 1) the right of individuals to ground their identity, 2) the demand of societies to define a 
political identity by explicating a meaning of founding events, its beginnings, its epoch-making 
events, and 3) the histories of the victims themselves, memories of the horrible crimes that must 
not be forgotten, memories of sufferings (Ricoeur 1991b,187,246). Ethical reconstruction of 
citizenship-identity is a function of societal care, extracted from Heidegger’s view of care as the 
form of human identity: in Ricoeur’s texts this is modified to be consistent with imperatives of 
hospitality to the other, developed from the ethics of Levinas (Ricoeur 1995b,5), and Arendt’s 
understanding of natality  as the potential of the individual to make new beginnings (see below).  
  This implies that there is always the option of telling a story where the victim and the 
collective who has legitimized terror give themselves a new identity. In that way Ricoeur seeks to 
replace the communicative scarcity which created victims with an ethics of hospitality on sharing 
language and identity, making a twist to Habermas’ observations of the risks of communicative 
fatigue (Ricoeur 1991b,254; 1994,163,190,202,227; 2000,133-145). In accordance with the 
Arendtian plea for a politic which regards difference and pluralism as facts of life, political 
identity must always be open to reform, in a spirit of asking and giving forgiveness for the 
impingements nations impose on one another. Forgiveness is a specific form of the revision of the 
past belonging to the order of charity, a tool to resist fanatism (Ricoeur 1991a,312; 1995b,9). A 
nation’s tale of founding events can be reorganized in a new articulation on strangers, sufferings, 
crimes, amnesties, rehabilitation, and the institution of pardon. Pardon seems to be an equivalent 
of forgiveness. Pardon is a kind of healing of memory, the end of mourning. Pardon gives 
memory a future, signifies our capacity to recreate ourselves in a new future (Ricoeur 
1995a,12,13; 2000,145). 
  At the turn of the millennium Ricoeur seems to become more aware of the persistence of a 
collective traumatism in cultures. This concerns especially the memorizing of the founding of 
nations: “What we celebrate under the title of founding events are, essentially, acts of 
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violence....what was glory for some was humiliation for others...in this way symbolic wounds 
calling for healing are stored in the archives of collective memory” (Ricoeur 2004b,cit p.79,82). 
Memory is considered as a vulnerable, risky action, cast out to uses and abuses (Ricoeur 
2004b,57). Memory-healing presupposes a combined work of memory and mourning to make the 
person capable of reconciliation with the past. Otherwise persons will repeat traumas as actions 
and there will be no reconciliation (Ricoeur 2004b,70). This also regards the pathology of 
collective memory and the therapeutic perspectives in the society which the demand for 
reconciliation opens. To break the memory which repeats the violence the joint work of memory 
and mourning should occupy a strategic position in reflection on the failures and abuses of 
memory. The target of this work is a happy memory where mourning comes to completion 
(Ricoeur 2004b,80,77). Forgiveness is put into the centre of ethics: ”Forgetting and forgiveness, 
separately and together, designate the horizon of all we say about an ethics of memory, included 
the horizon of a happy forgetting” (Ricoeur 2004bcit.412). 
  As to the hermeneutic of those key issues, forgetting and forgiveness, Ricoeur asserts that 
they must be held separate: For forgetting, the problematic relates to memory and faithfulness to 
the past, for forgiveness, the problematic relates to guilt and reconciliation with the past (Ricoeur 
2004b,413). If we compare Ricoeur`s approach with the theories mentioned in the opening of this 
article Ricoeur seems to place anxiety, shame, and desire in a lower place of the hierarchy of 
significant emotions (Ricoeur 1966,74; 1994,314,327-328). Real suffering, as experience of lack, 
and vulnerability to social violence, plays a greater role (Ricoeur 1994,3). Besides, Ricoeur 
considers wonder as a strong emotion; Wonder is the emotion which opens to the other and gives 
food to imagination (Ricoeur 1966,101).    
  Ricoeur’s opinion is that to understand the place of forgetting and forgiveness in an ethics 
of memory we must look at how the line between them is blurred in abuse and misunderstanding 
and how they sometimes must be held together (Ricoeur 2004b,448,476,479). Misunderstanding 
results in an overhasty assimilation of forgiveness into an exchange defined by reciprocity. A 
reciprocal relation between the offender and the victim ignores the fact that the victim is the first 
subject of forgiveness. Forgetting is here, in its abuse, a semi-passive, semi-active behavior 
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affecting an unfinished mourning (Ricoeur 2004b,450). A question then is how, in combat against 
misuse, the boundary between forgetting and forgiving can be kept intact. 
  From these prospects, Ricoeur turns to the question of fault, and the possibility of 
forgiveness. On the one hand, there is fault (stain, sin, guilt), and the unforgiveable in the abysses 
of history, held to paralyze our power to use societal action to care for society, but on the other 
hand there is the possibility of the announcement of forgiveness from a “height”, which says: 
“There is forgiveness”, held to release the power to act in capable ways. According to Ricoeur the 
first phenomena will bring to language an experience of solitude, failure, struggle, where agents 
bind themselves to their action, while the second will open the imagination to the possibility and 
praise of forgiveness (Ricoeur 2004b,457-459,466-467). Forgiveness gives voice to an 
eschatology of the representation of the past, constitutes the common horizon of memory, history 
and forgetting (Ricoeur 2004b,457). According to Ricoeur, this speech-act is congruent with 
“announcing anonymized source”(illéité, [Levinas]), - in Ricoeur`s phenomenology of self 
described as a voice from the heart of hearts =conscience (Ricoeur 1996,59). In a contemporary 
theological essay Ricoeur describes conscience as the inner forum where the justification and 
mandate of God is heard in hymns (Ricoeur 1995c;Wallace 2000;Wallace 2002). Ricoeur will 
insistently state that philosophy and theology are disparate discourses. Yet, at the level of speech-
acts, they may come together. Ricoeur relates to kinship between forgiving and giving, found in 
numerous cultures, and the power to communicate and fuel an imagination of Gods forgiveness.   
  As part of the eventualization (1*) of speech-acts, forgiveness eludes us. As a horizon, it 
always slips away from any grasp, is always incomplete, not belonging to us, but to an other 
economy, in contradiction to the abysses of faults and guilt. Forgiveness belongs to an economy of 
gift, as love also belongs to a faculty of gift (Ricoeur 2004b,467), - this idea being inseparable 
from the kerygma of Jesus Christ and from its inscription into a Trinitarian proclamation and 
typology of gifts, stated in the litany of the early church: 1.Cor, 12:1,31, about the gifts of the 
spirit, implying that “There is forgiveness, as there is joy, extravagance, love. Forgiveness 
belongs to the same family.” (cit: Ricoeur 2004b,467,468). Ricoeur’s argument is that this 
kerygma and proclamation are early speech-acts in the eventualization of the imagination of 
                                                 
1*  Eventualization :  how events manifests in time , mind, history (philosophically ) or creation (theologically). 
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forgiveness. It states the imagination which biblical language performativity effects.  These gifts, 
then, through their altarity, make a break into human history and install creative newness, at the 
same time as they reign beyond our control. We can only reach them through wonder, imaginary 
language and in our litanies, as in 1.Cor 13, 8, saying: Love remains (Ricoeur 
2004b,456,467,469). The gifts are not at our disposal, but belong to a family of sovereign 
phenomena in human life, situated far from the abysses (speech-acts) of guilt and fault. Ricoeur 
seems to regard love, joy, and forgiveness as analogical operations which seem to bear 
relationships between immanent meanings and values, probably reminiscent of what Wittgenstein 
termed “family resemblance” (Ward 2000,ix).  
  Since forgiveness does not belong to an economy of exchange, Ricoeur makes the proposal 
that forgiveness operates differently on the institutional level than in the margins of institutions. 
Inside the institutions forgiveness is impossible because forgiveness creating impunity is a great 
injustice (Ricoeur 2004b,470). Unforgiveness remains and true justice must be done. Further, an 
important argument is that institutions are carrying out kinds of incognito forgiveness. At this level, 
 acts of forgiveness, which originally did not take on meaning, because they were incapable of being 
transformed into institutions, can be professed in gestures or speech-acts  such as pardon, amnesty, 
or truth commissions, showing forgiveness in a will to make a distance between persons and the 
crime. Moderation, magnanimity, or self-limitation of the state, are “the shadow of forgiveness”. 
These gestures are also “quests for forgiveness.” What matters is their exceptional character. They 
signal their membership in two orders of thinking: Unforgiveable guilt, and exchange where guilt 
begins to be chipped away (Ricoeur 2004b,477-478,483,485-486). To Ricoeur forgiveness will then 
happen here, through a rich differentiation of speech-acts, incognito actions, public exercise, and 
rituals, such as Chancellor Brandt kneeling in Warzaw. Ricoeur also says, with Derrida, that there 
seems to be a spread, simply by staging, of the multiplying of scenes of repenting, confessing, and 
forgiving on the geo-political stage (Ricoeur 2004b p.469). Outside the institutions forgiveness is 
possible by a return to the self, where the individual makes use of a more direct capacity to unbind 
the offender from the act in a pure giving. The absolute measure of the gift is the love of one’s 
enemies  (Ricoeur 1994,3,18;Ricoeur 2004b,467) .    
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  This brings us to the last important argument in Ricoeur’s therapeutic recommendation, his 
use of Arendt’s philosophy of natality. Natality meaning: how human beings are introduced and 
introduces themselves to the world through birth, thought, biography and new action. Natality marks 
a realm of beginning and gift inherent in life itself, a beginning prior to debt and guilt. Sustained by 
the different modi of natality new action looks like a miracle and it is this miracle which sustains 
forgiveness’ capacity to unbind the actor from the act and makes the guilty capable of beginning 
again and thus to be restored to the capacity to renew the world (Ricoeur 2004b,489,493). Political 
reconciliation, as an institutional praxis which make promises, is then placed into this other 
eschatological realized economy of creativity (=natality). Accordingly, Ricour seems to identify 
another set of recapitulative speech-acts: promise, as wish for a reconciliate future. “The originality 
of this wish is that it consists not in action but in a representation taken up again in a series of 
speech-acts constituting the declarative dimensions of memory” (Ricoeur, 2004b,494 cit). “We will 
remember the victims of.., we promise,..we wish” (my phrases). As with the case of forgiveness, 
Ricoeur seems both to separate and fuse the political and theological horizons (Ricoeur, 2004b, 
492-493). We owe the possibility of a happy memory, a memory at peace, crowned with joy and 
professed in care (Ricoeur 2004b,505). Reconciliation is then possible, in spite of the unforgettable, 
through a dialectic of unbinding and binding which creates a new climate (Ricoeur 2004b,496).  
     3.0 Expanding the regimes of forgiveness 
 From our analysis of Ricoeur’s reconciliation pragmatics we can now make a further comment on 
the theories commented in the opening of this article. By placing pathological memory in the 
centre of his agenda for a therapy of modernity Ricoeur’s framework is inclusive of these 
theories. Victimization, differentiated through the specter of stigma, shame, social 
misunderstanding (term), or through ritual or sovereign administration, where people are placed 
in limbo-like situations, or excluded, is always accomplished by a forgetfulness of the violent 
event, the reconciling murder. We also observe how Ricoeur adds new dimension to the theories: 
Through the blurring of the lines between forgiveness, memory and forgetting, victimization 
persists in society. Through blurring practices the gestures of incognito forgiveness are constantly 
threatened with being immersed into calculations of market exchange and administrative 
manipulation. Indirectly Ricoeur seems to sustain the theories of Agamben, Butler and Habermas; 
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It appears that society, because of these evolving semi-memorizing practices and communicative 
fatigue, possibly, (but not certainly), may be in a new, risky, and instable post-secular phase: If 
mourning and memory practices are not extended, made visible in gestures and performatives, 
litanies, public rituals, which reveal, and make open, the human capacity of forgiveness, life 
might fall into new forms of sacred violence or emerge into the technological versions of 
governmentality. Society may lose its wider horizon of thought, and exchange it in small picture 
narratives, simulacra or substitutes to the lost memories. For Ricoeur, expanding the regimes of 
forgiveness is possible only if there are communities that repeat the performative gestures of the 
family of gifts, together with incognito forgiveness, as indiscriminate speech-acts which societies 
can not be without. Through this use of the language of gift we observe how Ricoeur aims to 
rescue life from a loss of memory of gifts. By reference to the economy of gifts a possibly post-
secular nihilism is attempted avoided and a non-violentary relinguistification of the sacred, is 
configured. 
       4.0 Which paradigm of reconciliation? 
  It is now time to compare Ricoeur’s model of reconciliation with the debate on 
reconciliation mentioned in the opening of this article. While we have explicated Ricoeur’s 
relation to the discourses of memory, trauma and guilt (all too briefly), we will explicate 
Ricoeur’s position in relation to Derrida and Habermas, to answer the question in the opening of 
this article.  
  First, to Habermas: in line with almost all authors on the theme, Habermas speaks of the 
necessity of mourning the past (Trauerarbeit), and of memory as a bulwark against a repressed 
reconciliation (Habermas 1987,138;Habermas 1992;Habermas 2003b,107). In congruence with 
his early theory of communicative action, his “action theoretical approach”, Habermas will put a 
contested rationality grounded in anamnesic reason, which resists the forgetting of victims, and 
also the forgetting of forgetting, in the forefront (Habermas 1989,377, 380). Since philosophy 
does not begin from the premise of an almighty and just deity, it cannot make use of the question 
of theodicy or the dogma of the resurrection of the victim in its plea for a culture of loss and what 
has been withheld from public consciousness. It must itself open the dimension of validity claims 
which transcend social space and historical time: “…now it is argumentative reason itself which 
  
10 
reveals, in the deepest layers of its own pragmatic suppositions, the conditions for laying claim to 
an unconditional meaning” (Habermas 2002cit 134). Speech-acts are directed towards 
illocutionary goals (wishes), communicated in the communicatively un-coerced act, goals that do 
not have the status to be realized inwardly (Habermas 2002,91,89). Post-metaphysical thought 
differs from religion in that it recovers the meaning of the unconditional without recourse to 
religion (Habermas 2002 cit.108).Yet, he acknowledges how western philosophy is intrinsically 
informed by the symbol of redemption and history in terms of salvation” (Habermas 1995a,15). 
Habermas will also acknowledge the potential of religious discourse to console people. 
  Consistent with these mandates, Habermas’ ethics has often, wrongly, been interpreted to 
be congruent with a progressive thesis of secularization. The linguistification process, the process 
of reconciliation transferred through overlapping consensus and ethical discourse on collective 
life-form seemed to presuppose a theory of religion as an intermediary stage in the development 
of cultures. The cleansing of modernity is fulfilled by a linguistification of the sacred, 
rationalization of myth, linguistification of the potential in the sacred, reconciliation without 
reenchantment (Habermas 1983; 1989,238).  
  In his recent work Habermas has reservations concerning the power of reconciliation 
reason to secure ethics. After the events of 9/11, 2001 he comments; “We are rightfully disturbed 
by the irreversibility of past sufferings…injustices that exceed every human power of redemption. 
The lost hope of redemption has left behind a palpable emptiness” (Habermas 2003a). Habermas’ 
argument defends religion’s practical contributions from a thesis of risky emptiness which makes 
out the instability of post-secular ethics. A thesis on religion as intermediary stage does not fit 
into a post-secular society. “The boundaries between secular and religious reasons are tenuous” 
(Habermas 2003a). Religion is a force against violence, not only a source of violence. But 
already, in Post-metaphysical thinking Habermas applies for a collaborative coexistence with 
religion, where philosophy surrenders its extraordinary status. Religious language is considered 
as bearer of a semantic content that is indispensable and continues to resist translation into 
reasoning discourses (Habermas 1995a 51).Yet, the significance of what it means that religious 
speech-acts resist translation seems to be unresolved. Another, repeated critique from the “warm 
current of critical theory”, sees Habermas’ theory as un-adaptable to the role of emotions in 
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consciousness raising and responsible action (Fraser 1989). The role of religions in cleansing 
emotions, is unanswered. 
   Now, to Derrida, as indicated in the opening of this article, the affirmation of religions 
role as a force against violence, takes a new turn in Derrida’s work. For Derrida, we should 
always think about the political crime. Grief expresses the necessity of a wrong that must be 
righted, a violence to be repaired (Derrida 1997 p.ix). For Derrida, friendship to come, means a 
mode of love which is, perhaps, a totally new experience, unheard of, a friendship for the future, 
friendship which relates to the community of those without a community, a weak community 
without foundation, religion without institutional  religion, in contradiction to ethnocentrism, 
populism or xenophobia (Derrida 1997 p.29,42,81,100,217,219,306). To Derrida, like Girard, 
messianic religion exists once the secret of the sacred, orgiastic has been, if not destroyed, at least 
integrated, and finally subjected to the sphere of responsibility (Derrida 1995,2,20,50). True 
religion begins in the heart of the single human being, the soul, the untouchable, innocence, in 
secrecy (Derrida 1995;Derrida 2005). According to Derrida, the other will represent a regime of 
the tender, the weak and indefinite, which undoes any attempt to secure ethics or politics in 
established metaphysics, rites, constitutionalism or institutional design (Derrida 2003). For 
Derrida responsible religion is the solution and hope of the post-secular condition. While 
Habermas takes a distanced stance to religions hope of fulfilling promise, Derrida desires religion 
with its gifts. Derrida, who once worked with Ricoeur at the University of Sorbonne, is 
overlapping with Ricoeur’s arguments on the resistance of gifts to a rational ethics. Habermas 
would possibly not deny this possibility, but would not affirm it either (Habermas 1995a, 51).  
  Decisive in Derrida’s work is the description of the absolute non-violent event of religion 
(messianicity) as the impossible possibility, beyond historic horizons. Forgiveness and memory 
appears as important topics for a reflection on just democracies. New justice is an 
undeconstructible horizon manifesting the need for developing an unconditional hospitality to the 
other (Derrida 1978; 1994; 2000). He appeals for a new religious cosmopolitanism, exercising a 
loving friendship and universal hospitality which transcends the present sphere of international 
law which operates in terms of reciprocal agreements and treaties between sovereign states. This 
is to think a politics, friendship and justice which begin by breaking with national “naturalness” 
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or homogeneity (Derrida 1997,105). Hospitality is a condition of culture itself (responsible 
culture) and not one ethic among others, insofar as it has to do with inclusion of the other which 
cultures else seek to appropriate, control and master (Derrida 2003, 8,16). Proliferation of the 
scenes and stages of forgiveness signifies how it is necessary to turn towards the past, and take as 
necessary the act of memory, self accusation, repentance, beyond the juridical instance, or nation 
state. We need to develop a new geo-politics of forgiveness, a globalization of forgiveness, 
justified by the sacredness, and secrecy of the human (Derrida 2003,30). He defends the purity of 
forgiveness, as non-normality, not by ethical or spiritual purism, but by the necessity to maintain a 
reference to an-economical  forgiveness, in accordance with a weak community to come (Derrida 
2003,30,38,59). Forgiveness should not be normal, normalizing. It should remain exceptional and 
extraordinary, in the face of the impossible; as it interrupts the ordinary course of history (Derrida 
2003,32).  
  Habermas and Derrida, though they profess different philosophies, both project the idea of 
a quasi-messianic eschatology. Yet, we note a remarkable difference. In Habermas’ work the 
linguistification process, the process of reconciliation transferred through overlapping rational 
consensus and ethical discourse on life-form, is restorative to the idea of a communicative 
society, a victimless society created through external inter-subjective communication (Habermas 
2001,82,86,88;Siebert 1985,12). The work of Derrida presupposes gifts, a religious messianicity 
restored from within, in the interiority and depth of the human self. While Habermas seems to 
imply a post-Hegelian, post-Kantian paradigm, filtered through critical theory, Derrida develops 
an anti-Hegelian, quasi-judaic idea of reconciliation. Derrida’s work presupposes another 
departure from critical theory, filtered through the philosophy of gift, prophetic eschatology, and 
cosmo-political messianicity, the messianic as a surprise, at any moment (Derrida & Vattimo 
1998). While Habermas’ therapy is designed through a technique of institutional design, 
reflection on good reasons and processive co-operation, Derrida’s vision of cosmopolitian 
democracy is informed by an ontology of promise which epiphanizes in singular events and 
breaks with processual collaboration and repetitive institutional design. While Habermas seems to 
imply reconciliation and healing of nations through cooperation of institutions, Derrida will await 
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new “democracy” through the inner intervention of the totally Other, through absolute 
eschatology.  
                 This makes a question of how we might consider Ricoeur’s project alongside that of 
Derrida and Habermas. There are certain arguments in Ricoeur, among them the reference to 
liminality, aporia, promise, inner economy of the self, gift, Kierkegaard and Levinasian other-
orientated ethics, which fit more to Derrida’s inner purity of forgiveness than to Habermas’ 
external “reconciliation through the public use of reason”. With Levinas, and subsequently 
Derrida, he defends the priority of narrative hospitality. Simultaneously Ricoeur, against Derrida, 
seems aware of the necessity of reconciliation as a public institutional practice, even if it must be 
done as an “incognito” speech-act. Ricoeur says that Habermas’ project is a “strong approach“, 
complementary to his own (Ricoeur 2004a,213). Reconciliation through the public use of reason, 
differentiated in levels of ethical discourse, legislative processes, and expansion of rights, may be 
interpreted as a far-reaching example of reconciliation as an incognito-speech-act. Simultaneously 
(discussing Derrida`s idea of a pure forgiveness), Ricoeur warns of a simplification of forgiveness 
in exchange, through a test of universalization, “feeding the confusion between universalized 
morality and internationalization and globalization” (Ricoeur 2004b,cit 469). The communicative 
ethics debate is indebted to Ricoeur for bringing the complexities of narrative discourse into 
sharper focus (Rainwater 1996). The speech-act processed through the communicative forum, 
seems indispensable for creating a conciliatory climate, but is not sufficient.                 
                How are we to understand those configurations? If religion professes its own 
indispensable knowledge claim (as Habermas asserts), how could we understand such a claim and 
differ it from claims that assign to the quasi-sacred violent foundations of nations which 
Agamben and Butler talk of? Could the Christian speech-act of forgiveness itself claim more than 
a Habermasian recognition of religious consolation? We will ask if Christianity, as one of the 
religions, communicates a performative gesture indispensable for dialogue. When Ricoeur 
integrates arguments related to gifts, emotions, and forgiveness as an incognito deliberate 
practice, the question arises if the approach of Ricoeur can be interpreted as a middle-route 




              5.0 Ricoeurs approach interpreted as a middle-route between Habermas and Derrida. 
  As already indicated in our analysis of Ricoeur’s conception of gift and caritative logic- the 
argument of how joy, love, extravagance, make a break into human history - Ricoeur will, when 
he applies his theory of speech-acts, indicate congruence with how the kerygma of Christology 
and the proclamation of Trinitarian dogma is performed historically. Ricoeur will then, not, in his 
own opinion, have gone beyond the limits of the philosophy and how philosophy situates speech-
acts as worldly events. Philosophy will point to the aporia of gifts (what Derrida calls the 
impossible), simultaneously as the phenomenology of speech-acts points to kerygma and 
proclamation as events in the world. We have already mentioned how Ricoeur hints at a kinship 
between how the forgiveness of God is presented to consciousness and how the human capacity 
to forgiveness is presented in the specter of speech-acts (p.6). Responsibility, religiously narrated 
or not, is situated, sustained and recapitulated through the differentiated sovereign utterances of 
love, joy, fecundity and natality, and also through “text”, sapiential poetry, public litanies, and 
narratives - leaving dialogue open for discussing how different speech-acts may release a 
reconciling climate.  
  From Ricoeur’s inclusiveness of theology as speech-act, a significant question regards 
Derrida’s and Habermas’ stance on the Christian performative. When Habermas argues for a 
relinguistification of the substance of salvation history, as resource for communicating 
reconciling reason, this implies a distanciation (rightly), to dogmatism and  religious irrationalism 
(Habermas 2002 p.1,2). In the institutional-communicative mode Versöhnung can be identified or 
known only as an indefinite reality - in continuation with Bildverbot - prohibitions of making 
images of God (Habermas 1978,35). Derrida is, like Habermas, negative to any identification of 
the messianic as represented in concrete religion (Derrida 1995).To Derrida  the other will 
represent a regime of the tender, which is indefinite, and undoes any attempt to secure ethics or 
politics in established  rites, constitutionalism or institutional design (Derrida 2003). 
Deconstruction is a regime which undoes its utopias and horizons as quickly as they are 
established (Derrida 2002). 
  A repeated critique against Habermas and Derrida, is that they, in respect of religion, 
abide in the desert of jewish (quasi) messianity and Bildverbot, and ignore the religion which 
makes a knowledge claim from incarnation, presence, charity, and mutuality as presupposition for 
divine sustenance of the world. Christianity will claim that gifts are incarnate in nutrition, 
energies, structures of embodiment, utterances of the soul, need, jouissance, economy of love, the 
neighbour and the possibility which eventualizes according to how cosmos eventualizes (Ward 
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2005 p.86,250). Theologians emphasize how Derrida breaks with the ontological models of 
presence that have grounded philosophy and theology (Long 2003,130;Lowe 2003;MacCammon 
2002;Ward 2003,76,89). A similar argument can be said of Habermas when he limits Christian 
speech-acts to being a “normalizing discourse of the extraordinary”. In theology creation 
cosmology and cosmic Christology will be the presupposition for eventualization as embodied 
pleroma (fullness), so that there is an economy of growth and expansion through “the operating 
of him operating in me in power [ten energeia autou ten energoumenen en emoi en dunamei]” 
Eph, 2, 12-13.   
  According to Ward, making a twist to Derrida’s term “the regime of the tender”, this 
pleroma is presented as the wisdom of God filling a space (=presence), manifest in the wounding 
of love, weak love, in the concrete history of the death, burial and resurrection of Jesus (Ward 
2005,257-261).Which theologically is the presupposition for the redemption of the victim, and 
the scandalizing of sacred violence (as Habermas rightly says). This argument is central in 
Girard: To Girard what Christ manifests on the cross is nothing other than a manifestation 
through performative repeating this scandal, the victimage mechanism, so that Christology 
manifests in this icon both the original trauma and the possibility of another praying and 
celebrating community without violent groundings. This ritual is a paradigm of every discourse 
which manifests victimhood (Girard 1977;Girard 1987,170,174,178-179,184;Lefebure 1998). It 
can be considered as the speech-act of Jesus in itself, as opposed to an idolatric one, a naming 
which is not only a naming but a de-naming, alert to the human tendency toward idolatry, (Girard 
1987p 170;Robbins 2003, 121-124.).Which, from a theological viewpoint, deconstructs what is at 
issue in the negative theology of Habermas and Derrida, because it informs us of a mutuality 
already here, shown through Jesus` performative of Abba as address to God (Jeremias 1972). 
  This difference is, of course, as Habermas and Derrida subsequently do philosophy, not 
theology, acknowledged in Habermas and Derrida. Habermas states that cosmos is a metaphysical 
or archaic presupposition that philosophy must proceed without. He substitutes it with the 
formula of the life-world. The horizons of our life histories and forms of life, form a porous 
whole of familiarities that retreat in the face of reflexive incursions, and expert cultures in 
science, morality and law (Habermas 1995a,16,20). He does not admit the possibility of a post-
secular reflexivity that makes cosmos appear as a contradiction to totalizing thinking through 
unfamiliar self- estrangement, chaocosmos and the simultaneous possible impossibility of 
eventualizations. “Making room for otherness is logically implied by the idea of 
creation”(Gregersen 2003 cit 207).When Habermas make the argument that religion’s language is 
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“indispensable in ordinary life for normalizing intercourse with the extraordinary”(Habermas 
1995a,51), he ignores that for theology discourse on the extraordinary will not mean without  
presence. The creation, in prophetic proclamation, does not refer to the archaic life-world, but 
reflective religion in the biblical sources themselves, where creation sometimes means an 
estrangement of religions’ historic life-worlds and an affirmation of creation as non-normalizing 
intercourse of God. As I see it, the mutuality, revealed by Jesus, in his Abba speech-act, is 
singular, a new naming. This naming of God, as other, but mutual counterpart - is indispensable 
for the Christian dialogue on reconciliation. 
   Derrida seems to be open for a reappraisal of cosmic eventualization, but will admit that 
Christianity involves a thought on creation, presence and mutuality which is unacceptable in his 
quasi- judaism. It is only possible in a messianicity that goes beyond Christendom. Contact 
between God and the soul or the mind of humanity can only be mutual (mutuus contactus), in the 
gracious tactility of love. According to Derrida the essence of Christian loving is immediate 
transitivity, dissymmetry- and reciprocity. “This particular reciprocity would no doubt,..be 
unacceptable in a discourse, such as Levinas, if not in Judaism in general, because of the 
touching and because of this mutuality as experience of the divine”(Derrida 2005 p.250).  
             In Ricoeur’s double charitable paradigm of reconciliation mutuality is presupposed: When 
Ricoeur on philosophical bases identifies a spectrum of speech-acts of forgiveness, through 
different sources, and also, on theological bases, signifies reconciliation (justification) as a 
speech-act of God, the discourses are not contradictory to each other. To Ricoeur the charitable 
gift “forgiveness sustained by love” is itself new mutuality, it appears as wonder, akin to religious 
miracle and promise. When forgiveness is a for-giving, Ricoeur presupposes a natal 
eventualization, which is cosmic. The saying: “There is” forgiveness, as there is joy, wisdom, 
extravagance (=hospitality), means that this family of utterances, with its resemblances in action 
and closeness to natality, are intimate with creation. Ricoeur’s philosophical paradigm 
presupposes intersubjective communication and friendly communication, as already informed by 
love and natality. It is because of the love we experience in daily mutual contact and spacing, that 
“There is” a possibility to understand the performative of the incognito forgiveness, and turn it 
into a knowledge claim of our promising. Love, joy, and natality, as incarnated powers from the 
earth, are nearer to us in our vulnerability, pathology of emotions, anomie, misunderstanding and 
blurring of practices than we are ourselves. The conjoint work of mourning, memory and 
forgetting can make us anticipate another future. Sustained by love it can heal emotions, reopen 
horizons, put wonder back in place. It is by interpreting that we can hear again. Ricoeur’s re-
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linguistification of the sacred happens then, through a “second naivitée in and through criticism”. 
It is, in my opinion, a criticism after trauma, after state terrorism, after the cross, and after 
celebration and singing of hymns. The purpose of religious speech-acts is not to explain, but to 
disclose and evoke in the human heart a response. To Ricoeur metaphor and icon are beyond 
rhetorical or tropical device. They function as figurative conveyors of possible meanings. 
Metaphor is a complex intersection of logical, semantic and imagistic movements which resist 
any simplistic limitation to a starched oppositional format -as indicated in Derrida’s 
deconstructionism. “Icon”, refers to the non-verbal kernel in the quasi visual kernel of 
imagination, imagery understood in the quasi-visual, quasi- auditory, quasi-tactile sense. 
Metaphor will also initiate new meaning that has implications for reality, in that it makes new 
experience come to language. Living metaphor has the capacity to change the world (Joy 1988, 
520-521).With metaphor and speech new experience is brought unto concept, and eventualization 
intersects in the self of the listener. The to come, which Derrida speaks of, is, in Ricoeur’s text, 
congruent with realized eschatology, and Ricoeur will escape absolutisms.  
            What we assert is that the mutuality which Christianity talks of, is an indispensable 
argument for an understanding of the reason why we are always motivated. Because of the happy 
memories of this first mutuality, in fecund relations, love, and action, that stay in consciousness 
and symbols beside the unhappy traumatic memories, it will always be a possibility that we 
expect new mutuality through forgiveness. Without a memory of first mutuality, it becomes  
incomprehensible why the offender would seek the other in a movement of a plea for forgiveness. 
Ricoeur opens post-secular thought to a consideration of gifts as remaining here. Reconciliation 
is also from the earth, since through natal gifts we are given incarnated newness, possibilities to 
restore life. Reconciliation is not indefinite. Content can be memorized in celebratory practices, 
making us ready for the to come.  
             In Derrida’s texts authentic religion seems emptied of content and even of horizons. The 
opening of the future is, or must be, without horizon of expectation, with an absolutely 
undetermined messianic hope at its heart (Derrida 1994;Derrida & Vattimo 1998,8,17;Derrida 
1976). Habermas seems to understand reconciliation as a slightly formal process. Versöhnung can 
be identified or known only as an indefinite reality - in continuation with prohibitions of making 
images of God (Bildverbot). Habermas and Derrida both profess an abstract messianicity, they 
marginalize reconciliation at the level of convictions and emotions (Ricoeur 2004a,214). 
Christianity, as a teaching of incarnation, will talk of reconciliation both from the inside and from 
the outside, manifest in celebration. Ricoeur presents a model of reconciliation that is critical to 
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an absolute abstracted eschatology: Reconciliation appears inclusive to a thinking of God as 
incarnated, mutual counterpart. Reconciliation has begun. Reconciliation, at the level of hearts 
and politics, is consistent with a caritative model of reconciliation, since societal care is professed 
as the form of the liberative life. If care is the form of human life, God is the giver of this life.  
References 
 
2004, Beyond Violence Religious Sources of Social Transformation in Judaism, Christianity and 
Islam, Heft, James L edn, Fordham University press, New York. 
Agamben, G. 1998, Homo Sacer Sovereign Power and Bare Life Stanford University press, 
Stanford. 
Agamben, G. 2005, State of Exception University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Amstutz, M. R. 2005, The Healing of Nations The Promise and Limits of Political Forgiveness 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Oxford. 
Battle, M. 2002, "A Theology of Community The Ubuntu Theology of Desmond Tutu", 
Interpretation, vol. 54, no. 02, pp. 171-191. 
Bloom, S. 1997, Creating Sanctuary Toward an evolution of Sane Societies Routledge, New 
York. 
Butler, J. 2004, Precarious life the powers of mourning and violence Verso, London. 
Caruth, C. 1996, Trauma Explorations in Memory The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 
and London. 
Derrida, J. 1978, Writing and Difference Routledge, London. 
Derrida, J. 1994, Spectres of Marx: The State of Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New 
International, Routledge, London. 
Derrida, J. 1995, The gift of Death University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Derrida, J. 1997, Politics of friendship Verso, London/New York. 
Derrida, J. 2000, Of hospitality Stanford University press, Stanford. 
Derrida, J. 2002, Lovens makt. "Autoritetens mystiske grunnlag" Spartacus forlag, Oslo. 
Derrida, J. 2003, Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness Routledge, London and New York. 
  
19 
Derrida, J. 2005, On Touching- Jean Luc Nancy Stanford University press, Stanford. 
Derrida, J. & Vattimo, G. 1998, Religion Polity Press, Cambridge. 
Derrida, J. 1976, Of Grammatology John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore. 
Douglas, M. 1966, Purity and danger an analysis of concepts of pollution and taboo Routledge & 
Kegan,Paul, London. 
Fraser, N. 1989, Unruly practices: poeer, discourse and gender in contemporary social theory 
Polity press, Oxford. 
Gillis, J. R. 1994, Commemorations Princeton University press, Princeton. 
Girard, R. 1977, Violence and the sacred The John Hopkins University press, London. 
Girard, R. 1987, Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World Stanford University Press, 
Stanford. 
Goffman, E. 1963, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity Penguin. 
Gregersen, N. H. 2003, On the Emergence of Life and Meaning Oxford University Press, 
Oxford/New York. 
Habermas, J. 1978, "Urgeschichte der Subjektivitât," in Politik,Kunst, Religion, Philipp Reclam 
jun, Stuttgart. 
Habermas, J. 1983, "A Reply to my critics," in Habermas Critical Debates, J. B. Thompson & D. 
Held, eds.. 
Habermas, J. 1987, Eine Art Schadensabwicklung Surkamp, Frankfurt am Main. 
Habermas, J. 1989, The Theory of Communcative Action Beacon Press, Boston. 
Habermas, J. 1992, Moralbewusstsein und Kommunikatives Handeln A.M.Suhrkamp 
Taschenbuch, Frankfurt. 
Habermas, J. 1995a, Postmetaphysical Thinking Polity Press, Cambridge UK. 
Habermas, J. 1995b, "Reconciliation through the public use of reason Remarks on John Rawls` 
Political Liberalism", Journal of Philosophy, vol. XIII, no. 3 (march), pp. 117-118. 
Habermas, J. 2001, The Liberating power of Symbols Philosophical Essays Polity, Cambridge. 
Habermas, J. 2002, Religion and rationality Blackwell, Cambridge/Oxford. 
Habermas, J. 2003a, "Speech by Jürgen Habermas accepting the Peace Price of the German 
  
20 
Publishers and Booksellers association, Paulskirche, Frankfurt Süddeutche Zeitung,14 October 
2001, printed in Habermas (2003) Zeitdiagnosen, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp 
.," Suhrkamp, Frankfurt. 
Habermas, J. 2003b, Zeitdiagnosen Zwölf Essays Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main. 
Hughes, B. 2002, "Bauman´s stranger: impairment and the invalidation of disabled people in 
modern and postmodern cultures", Disability & Society, vol. 17, no. 5, pp. 571-584. 
Jeremias, J. 1972, New Testament Theology SCM Press, London. 
Joy, M. 1988, "Derrida and Ricoeur: A Case of Mistaken Identity (and Difference)", Journal of 
Religion, vol. 68, no. 4, pp. 508-526. 
Lefebure, L. D. 1998, "Beyond scapegoating: A conversation with René Girard and Ewert 
Cousins", Christian Century, vol. April 8. 
Long, S. 2003, "Radical Orthodoxy," in The Camibridge Companion to Postmodern Theology, K. 
J. Vanhoozer, ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, pp. 126-148. 
Lowe, W. 2003, "Christ and Salvation," in The Cambridge Companion to Postmodern Theology, 
K. J. Vanhoozer, ed., Cambridge University press, Cambridge, pp. 235-251. 
MacCammon, L. 2002, "Jacques Derrida, Paul Ricoeur, and the marginalization of Christianity: 
Can the God of presence be saved?," in Paul Ricoeur and Contemporary Moral Thought, J. Wall, 
W. Schweiker, & D. Hall, eds., Routledge, New York, pp. 187-212. 
Natzmer, C. 2002, "Remembering and Forgetting: Creative Expression and Reconciliation in 
Post-Pinochet Chile," in Social Memory and History, J. Clima & M. Cattell, eds., Altamira press, 
Oxford. 
Nussbaum, M. 2004, Hiding from Humanity, Disgust, Shame and the Law Princeton University 
Press, Princeton and Oxford. 
Rainwater, M. 1996, "Refiguring Ricoeur: narrative force and communicative ethics," in Paul 
Ricoeur The Hermeneutics of Action, London/Thousand Oakes/New Delhi, Sage, pp. 99-110. 
Ricoeur, P. 1995a, "Memory - Forgetfulness - History", ZIF, vol. 2. 
Ricoeur, P. 1966, Freedom an Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary Norwestern University 
Press, Evanston. 
Ricoeur, P. 1991a, "Love and Justice," in Radical Pluralism and Truth, D. Tracy, ed., The 
Crossroad Publ.Co. 
Ricoeur, P. 1991b, Time and Narrative The University of Chicago press, Chicago. 
  
21 
Ricoeur, P. 1994, Oneself as Another The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Ricoeur, P. 1995b, The Hermeneutics of Action Sage Publications, London. 
Ricoeur, P. 1995c, "The Summoned Subject in the School of the Narratives of the Prophetic 
Vocation," in Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, and Imagination, M. I. Wallace, ed., 
Fortress Press, Minneapolis. 
Ricoeur, P. 1996, "Intellectual Biography," in The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, L. E. Hahn, ed., 
Open Court, Chicago/La Salle Il., pp. 1-53. 
Ricoeur, P. 2000, The Just The Universiy of Chicago Press, Chicago . 
Ricoeur, P. 2004a, Memory, narrativity, self and the challenge to think God LIT Verlag, Münster. 
Ricoeur, P. 2004b, Memory,History and Forgetting The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Robbins, J. W. 2003, Between Faith and Thought University of Virginia Press, 
Charlottesville/London. 
Siebert, R. J. 1985, The Critical Theory of Religion The Frankfurt School Morton Publishers, 
Berlin. 
Taylor, C. 2006, "Notes on the Sources of Violence: Perennial and Modern," in Beyond Violence 
Religious Sources of Social Transformation, J. L. Heft, ed., Fordham University Press, New 
York. 
Volf, M. 1996, Exclusion & Embrace A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness and 
Reconciliation Andon Press, Nashville. 
Wallace, M. I. 2000, "From Phenomenology to Scripture? Paul Ricoeurs hermeneutical 
philosophy of Religion", Modern Theology, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 301-313. 
Wallace, M. I. 2002, "The Summoned Self: Ethics and hermeneutics in Paul Ricoeur in dialogue 
with Emmanuel Levinas," in Paul Ricoeur and Contemporary Moral Thought, J. Wall, W. 
Schweiker, & D. Hall, eds., Routledge, New York, pp. 80-96. 
Ward, G. 2000, Cities of God Routledge, New York. 
Ward, G. 2003, "Deconstructive Theology," in The Cambridge Companion to Postmodern 
Theology, K. J. Vanhoozer, ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, pp. 76-91. 
Ward, G. 2005, Christ and Culture Blackwell, Oxford. 
 
 
